Introduction
The number of firms in a market is a key variable for competition analysis and policy. The realistic observation that it is costly for buyers to discover the lowest selling price in a market (search costs)
widens the theoretical predictions on the relationship between market structure and level and dispersion of equilibrium prices, complicating market analysis and policy formulation 1 . In this vein, under search costs, some models predict a positive association between the number of sellers and the average equilibrium selling prices [Rosenthal (1980) ; Varian (1980) ], whereas others predict a negative one [Carlson and McAfee (1983) ]. In addition, predictions on the relationship between price dispersion and the number of sellers differ depending on the assumptions about search activity, the distribution of search costs across buyers, and the heterogeneity of producers In this paper we use a large proprietary database to study interest rate levels and dispersion in twenty-two loan and deposit products offered by Spanish banks in fifty different geographic markets over the 1989 to 2003 period. Therefore, we have data for a whole industry in a country over a long period. The main research question is to examine the effect of market structure variables (i.e., number of banks in a province) on the average level and dispersion of interest rates in each bank product market. The null hypotheses, drawn from the Carlson and McAfee (1983) model of competition in retail markets with search costs, are confronted with alternative ones drawn from other models of price dispersion. The fact that banks collect deposits and grant loans justifies the extension of the Carlson and McAfee model to vertically related product markets, as is the case with bank deposit products and loan products.
1. Stigler (1961) opened the research path on how imperfect buyers' information can cause price dispersion in markets with homogeneous products. Further theoretical work has been devoted to refine Stigler's predictions and to provide formal conditions under which price dispersion may be an equilibrium solution in non-differentiated product markets [Rothschild (1973) ; Rosenthal (1980) 2. Existing evidence in support of search costs, as an explanation for observed price dispersion, comes from papers that link price dispersion to product-specific inflation [Stigler and Kindhal (1970) ; Van Hoomissen (1988) ; Reinsdorf (1994) ], to differences in search costs and search activity across markets [Pratt, Wise and Zeckhauser (1979) ; Dahlby and West (1986) ; Hayes and Ross (1998) ; Brown and Goolsbee (2002) ; Barron, Taylor and Umbeck (2004) ], and to the frequency of repeated purchases of products [Sorensen (2000) ]. Other papers that provide evidence consistent with search costs are Hortacçu and Syverson (2004) and Hong and Shum (2006) . The role of exchange rates and product differentiation to explain price dispersion is analyzed in Goldberg and Verboven (2001) . 3. Ellison and Ellison (2005) show the discrepancies found in studies that use Internet-based commerce data.
Our database is a panel of interest rates charged by banks for new loans granted during the quarter and of interest rates paid in new deposit transactions, also during the respective quarter. This database has important advantages: First, interest rates are the prices of transactions that took place, not just posted prices for which we do not know whether actual transactions take place or not. One important limitation of using posted prices, as is the case in most of the research on price dispersion on Internet selling sites, is that the researcher does not know whether there are transactions or not at prices that are different from the lowest one [ Internet markets is that buyers either search and buy from the lowest price producer or do not search at all because they are loyal to particular sellers. Since our evidence contradicts predictions from Internet-adapted search models, the conclusion is that price formation follows different patterns in Internet markets than in brick and mortar markets.
Section 2 presents the preliminary analysis of price differences in Spanish retail banking.
Section 3 presents the theoretical predictions of the determinants of interest rate dispersion. In section 4 we present the explanatory variables and the empirical models used to test the theoretical predictions. Section 5 contains the results of the empirical analysis. Finally, in section 6
we summarize the main results of the paper. We identify fifty different geographic markets one for each of the Spanish provinces (the lowest possible level of geographic desegregation permitted by the data). For each product and province, we only consider banks that have a significant presence in the province (at least, three branches) and have a relevant volume of business in that loan/deposit market (at least, eight months per year selling the product). National banks operate in many provinces and have an average market share of around 34% across provinces. We do not know the price charged by a national bank in a given province. In the empirical analysis reported in this paper we assume that national banks charge the same interest rate nationwide (since national banks advertise interest rates of products such as mortgages or deposits nationwide). We perform robustness analysis of the results excluding national banks from the data to see if the results are sensitive to this assumption on the pricing policy by these banks. Therefore, our interest rate variable is r ijmt , the interest rate charged or paid by bank j (j=1 to 215) in product I (i=1 to 22) in province m (m=1 to 50) during quarter t (t=1 to 58). 4. For loans: Receivables (less than 3 months; 3 months to 1 year; 1 to 3 years), Credit Line (less than 3 months; 3 months to 1 year; 1 to 3 years; more than 3 years), Personal (less than 3 months; 3 months to 1 year; 1 to 3 years; more than 3 years) and Mortgages (always more than 3 years). For deposits: Current Accounts, Savings Accounts, Deposits (less than 3 months; 3 to 6 months; 6 months to 1 year; 1 to 2 years; more than 2 years), and Repo operations (less than 3 months; 3 to 6 months; 6 months to 1 year). A complete description of the database can be found in Martín-Oliver, Salas and Saurina (2007) . 5. We only consider banks that are active in retail banking. Licensed banks with no activity in retail banking (i.e., wholesale banks), as well as foreign banks involved exclusively in investment banking, are excluded. We focus on commercial and savings banks, with a 95% market share. A more detailed analysis of the Spanish banking market can be found in Caminal, Gual and Vives (1993) and in Salas and Saurina (2003) . 6. The daily quoted interbank interest rate is taken as the basic interest rate of the economy. It is highly correlated with other reference interest rates.
coefficients of variation shown in 
The sources of variability in interest rates considered are: time, product class, bank, and province. . In both loans and deposits, the fixed effects of time, bank, product, and province explain up to two thirds of the variability observed in interest rates relative to the interbank rate in Spain, although the contribution of each source of variability is different in loans and in deposits. For the loan products, the main source of relative variability in the interest rates is due to Time effects (46% of the explained variation). Next, the Bank specific effects account for close to 27% of the relative variability observed in interest rates. Product class contributes to relative variability in interest rates by 12% of the explained variation. Finally, there is 1.8% of relative variability in interest rates of loans explained by Province effects. In the case of deposits, the main source of relative variability is the Product class, as 87% of the explained variance is attributed to this factor, followed by Bank (7.4%), Time (4.3%) and Province (1.05%). Udell (1992), Berlin and Mester (1999) ]. We assume that all bank customers do some search and face a positive cost for discovering the more attractive offer in the market. We also assume the same search model for loan than for deposit products, since there are no a priori reasons to assign a diffrent degree of search activity in the two product markets.
Basic model
The model of retail banking with search costs is adapted from Carlson and McAfee (1983) . 
where R m * is the average of interest rates charged by banks in loan market m. Under similar assumptions about the structural parameters and search activity the supply of deposits offered to bank j is given by,
where rm* is the average interest rate paid in deposit market m.
Consider first the case where loan and deposit markets are separated by the interbank market with interest rate I. Let l j represent the operating unit cost of loans and dj represent the operating unit costs of deposits for bank j. If B m is the amount borrowed or lent in the interbank market, and the budget constraint D m + B m =L m is binding, the profit-maximizing problem of the bank is given by,
Let l m * and d m * be the average operating costs of loans and deposits in market m, respectively. Then, the first order conditions imply, after some algebraic manipulations,
These results are similar to those of Carlson and McAfee, adapted to loan and deposit markets and assuming constant returns to scale in production of banking services. Equations (5) and (7) refer to individual bank interest rates, and equations (6) and (8) . A similar result is obtained for deposits from (7).
increases with Nm, the dispersion of the equilibrium interest rates of loans and deposits increases with the number of banks in the market; also, for a given number of firms, dispersion will be higher in markets where the differences in operating costs across firms are more pronounced [higher Sd (ljm)]. Notice that, under the assumption of separate loan and deposit markets, the dispersion of interest rates in the loan market is independent of the dispersion in the deposit market and vice versa.
According to equations (6) and (8), average equilibrium interest rates of loans (deposits) decreases (increases) with the number of banks N and increases (decreases) with the range of search costs T. Interest rates on loans and deposits both increase with the interbank rate; higher average unit operating costs increase the average equilibrium interest rate on loans and decreases that of deposits.
Non-separation between loan and deposit markets
Now banks use their deposits to finance the loans they grant. To simplify, we assume that all loans come from the bank deposits (otherwise the financial opportunity cost of loans would be a weighted sum of the interbank rate and of the interest rate of deposits). The profit maximizing problem for loans is now formulated as:
and s.t. the supply equal to demand condition
The first order conditions of optimum imply: The basic predictions on the determinants of dispersion and average equilibrium interest rates of loans and deposits remain unchanged with respect to those obtained under separation of the loan and deposit markets, although the actual effects of the exogenous variables on the dispersion of equilibrium interest rates is different under integration than they were under separation. First, under integration, the dispersion of interest rates in loans and in deposits, in both cases, depends on the dispersion across banks of operating costs of producing loans and of producing deposits [equations (10) and (12) in vertically integrated and vertically separated markets is new in the literature. We find that integration implies that dispersion in equilibrium prices in downstream and upstream markets will both be affected by the dispersion of operating costs for the two sides of the market; this is likely to contribute to higher equilibrium price dispersion, compared with separation, since the operating costs for each side of the market are unlikely to be negatively correlated. However, the weight (as a function of number of firms) of dispersion in unit operating costs in determining the dispersion in equilibrium prices is lower under integration than under separation. Consequently the overall net effect of vertical market integration versus separation in price dispersion is ambiguous.
Other determinants of price dispersion
In the absence of search costs, monopolistic competition with differentiated products and heterogeneous producers (i.e., different marginal costs) can create price dispersion in equilibrium [Perloff and Salop (1985; Barron, Taylor and Umbeck 2004) ]. The theoretical prediction is that both price level and dispersion will decrease with the number of sellers in the market. Stahl (1989) considers a market with homogeneous producers, all with the same marginal cost, where buyers split into two groups: buyers with no search at all, so each of them knows the price that every firm is quoting; and uninformed buyers that perform costly search until they find a price lower than the respective reservation price. The Stahl model departs from Carlson and McAfee in that it assumes equal marginal costs across producers and search costs that are not uniformly distributed across buyers. The empirical prediction is that, in equilibrium, both price dispersion and average prices will now increase with the number of sellers in the market [Barron, Taylor and Umbeck (2004) Varian (1980) results assuming that search costs are zero in clearing markets such as the Internet-based commerce, where the potential buyers receive a list of offers from different sellers. Not all of the buyers buy with the criterion of choosing the product with the lowest price, and strategic behavior by profit-maximizing sellers implies that the gap between the lowest and the next-to-the-lowest listed price (a measure of dispersion), and the average price listed on the page, will both decrease with the number of listed prices.
Early empirical work in price dispersion under search costs investigated the factors that affect the incentives of buyers to invest in information about prices in contexts of repeated purchases. One of these factors is price inflation. The argument is that changes in the price level for a particular product produce obsolescence of the stock of available information about the distribution of prices among sellers, so it is more difficult and costly for the search process to reduce price dispersion [Stigler and Kindhal (1970) ; VanHoomisen (1988) ]. Thus, price dispersion will increase with product specific inflation. Another factor that affects price dispersion is the frequency of transactions in a repeated purchase process [Fishman and Rob (1995) ; Sorensen (2000)]. The prediction here is that a higher frequency of transactions lowers price dispersion because the information acquired.
4
Variables and empirical models
Variables
We postulate one empirical model to explain the level of interest rates in a province market and another empirical model to explain the dispersion in interest rates in each province. Since part of variability in observed interest rates may respond to banks' product differentiation policies and not to the existence of search costs in markets with homogeneous products, in estimating the determinants of the level of interest rates in a given market we use bank-level data (instead of the average interest rates for all banks in the market as postulated by equations (6) and (8) of the model); this will allow us to control for bank fixed effects in the estimation. The dependent variable in the model that explains the level of interest rates is ln rjmt -ln It , the relative difference between interest rate of the bank in a given product, market and time period and the interbank rate for that time period. We explain relative differences because they are less sensitive to a time trend.
The measure of interest rate dispersion in a given province will be the coefficient of The model to be estimated will also control for fixed effects, which include (depending on the equation being estimated) time dummy variables to control for the time-varying effects that are common to all banks (i.e., the decreasing trend in the interbank rate over time), fixed effects of province that capture the differences of state prices, salaries and other factors that may vary across markets; and bank effects (in the level equation) that capture sources of variation due to product differentiation by banks (branch network, complementary services, etc.). Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables. Note that the average number of banks in each province market is large (around 30) and increasing over time.
Empirical model
The two main equations to be estimated are, autocorrelation is expected since we take first differences in the variables).
In the case of level of interest rates of loans, from (6) we expect g1<0; g2<0; and g3=0 if loans and deposits are separated by the interbank rate, and g3>0 if they are integrated [equation (11)]. For deposits, equation (8), we expect g1>0 and g2>0. If there is some time convergence in interest rates, the product specific inflation will be inversely related to the average interest rate (g4<0). On determinants of price dispersion, equation (14), we expect h1>0, h2<0, and h3=0, if loans and deposits are separated markets, or h3>0 if they are integrated; we expect h1>0 and h2<0 also for deposits. From models that link price dispersion with product specific inflation we expect h4>0. From the Stahl model of homogenous sellers and non-uniform distribution of search costs, the main prediction that is different from Carlson and McAfee is g1>0 for loans and g1<0 for deposits.
Equations (13) and (14) are specified and estimated separately for each bank product (12 loan products and 10 deposit products). The null hypothesis of the same empirical model for the pool of all loans and for the pool of all deposits is rejected at high levels of significance. We also reject the null hypothesis that the model is the same for all products of different maturity within the same product class (for example the same model for all Personal loans of different maturity or the same model for Deposits of all maturity). So the data justify that each maturity within each product class be treated as a different product market. Results   Tables 4 and 5 present the results of estimating models (13) and (14), respectively. The number of observations for the estimation of the level equations varies depending on the number of banks that supply every product, whereas the number of observations of the dispersion regression (14) is 750 (50 provinces and 15 time periods). The estimated coefficients shown in Table 5 are long term, since they have been obtained by dividing the original coefficient by one minus the estimated coefficient of the lagged dependent variable (positive and statistically significant in all estimations, although not reported to save space).
The estimations of the level equations (Table 4) show that the F-tests of aggregate significance of the bank, province and time groups of dummy variables (individually and jointly) reject the null hypothesis of non-statistical relevance. The results obtained from the estimation are robust to the set of instruments used, as we have regressed the model using different combinations of instruments from t-2 up to t-4 and the sign and significance of the ⎯coefficients was not altered. The R 2 of all the regressions was close to 0.9, in part due to the high explanatory power of the groups of dummy variables. Further, the validity of the estimations of the dispersion equation is also accepted as they passed all the consistency tests (Table 5) . First, the p-value from the statistic of the Sargan tests for compatibility of the orthogonal conditions is close or equal to 1 in all estimations. Second, the null hypothesis of absence of second-order autocorrelation cannot be rejected for any product at a significance level of 5%. Therefore, the models are well specified from an econometric point of view. We now describe the results under the lens of the predictions from the theory. Table 4 shows that the coefficients of ln NBANKS are positive in nine out of ten deposit products and statistically significant in four of them, as predicted by the Carlson and McAfee model. The sign of the estimated coefficients for the variable ln DENBRANCH is positive in all of the deposit products, and seven out of ten are statistically significant, which suggest that higher density of branches increases competition.
Determinants of average interest rates
As for the control variables that are included in the model, the level of interest rates is, in general, lower in larger province markets (i.e., more populated) with a high level of per capita income (POPULATION has nine negative signs, four significant; PINCOME has eight negative signs, two significant). Next, all of the statistically significant coefficients of the product-specific inflation variable, D, are negative, which implies that markets with lower relative change in the average interest rate over time are those with higher interest rates (convergence). Finally, the statistically significant coefficients of the SHARENA variable suggest that the presence of national banks does not affect the level of deposit interest rates.
For loans, the estimated coefficient of Ln NBANK is negative, as predicted by the model, in all loan products but one, and it is significant in seven of them. The explanatory variable, LEVrmtdeposit, has a positive and statistically significant estimated coefficient for all loan products:
in provinces with higher interest rates of deposits, the interest rates of loans are also higher. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that banks take the marginal interest rate paid for deposits as the marginal financial cost of their loans (integration).
Provinces with higher densities of branches tend to have higher average loan interest rates (ten out of twelve coefficients are positive, three of them statistically significant; in Mortgages, however, the density of branches has an unexpected negative sign). The coefficients of POPULATION and PINCOME are positive in some loan products and negative in others. In general,
their estimated values are smaller in absolute values than for deposits, so the effect of the size of the market variables on the average interest rates of loans is less clear than in the case of deposits.
The coefficients of the product-specific inflation variable are all negative, and all but two are statistically significant; evidence is thus found of the convergence effect in loan products as well.
Six of the seven statistically significant coefficients of the variable SHARENA are negative, concentrated mainly in Personal loans and Mortgages. Therefore, the evidence suggests that the greater presence of national banks in a given province market tends to lower the average interest rates on loans to households, but does not affect the interest rates of loans to firms (Receivables and Credit lines) ⎯perhaps because local firms may find it easier to engage in relational lending with local lenders than with distant ones. Table 5 shows that, for deposits, the coefficient of the number of banks is positive in seven cases and negative in three. Four out of the seven positive coefficients are statistically significant, while all of the negative coefficients are statistically insignificant. The hypothesis from Carlson and McAfee's model that price dispersion will increase with the number of banks in the market cannot be rejected. The negative and significant sign of three estimated coefficients for density of branches is consistent with the prediction that dispersion decreases as the range of search costs decreases; however, the estimated coefficient for the variable is positive and significant in two cases.
Determinants of dispersion
Consequently, overall, the conclusion as to the effect of density of branches on the interest rate dispersion of deposits is ambiguous.
For loan products the estimated coefficient of the variable number of banks is positive in ten of the twelve loan products; seven of the ten positive coefficients are significantly different from zero, and none of the three negative coefficients are statistically significant. Therefore, in loan products, the hypothesis that interest rate dispersion increases with the number of banks is also, in general, supported by the data. Table 5 However, all of the significant coefficients of the variable PINCOME are negative, which suggest a negative effect of customers' wealth on price dispersion. The negative sign also dominates among the statistically significant coefficients for the variable product-specific inflation (11 out of 13), so the empirical evidence suggests a negative association between product specific-inflation and price dispersion.
Robustness analysis
The empirical model (14) is estimated again with a range of interest rates, Range rmt/Avg rmt, as the dependent variable (Table 6 ). The Carlson and McAfee model predicts the same pattern of results, in terms of the signs of the coefficients of the explanatory variables, when dispersion is measured by range as when it is measured by the standard deviation. The results shown in Table 6 , overall, confirm the conclusions obtained when dispersion is measured in terms of the standard deviation of residual interest rates for both deposit and loan products.
One potential limitation of our results is that we do not know whether national banks set interest rates with a national policy resulting in the same interest rate in each province, or whether they follow local market policies. To test the extent to which the results above are sensitive to the assumption on interest rates of national banks we perform robustness analyses in two ways: First, we estimate the empirical models of average level and dispersion of interest rates excluding the national banks data. Second we estimate the model with the full data set excluding the share of national banks (SHARENA) as an explanatory variable. In all cases the main results of the empirical analysis are maintained (i.e., the effect of the number of banks in average interest rates and their dispersion, and the effect of deposit interest rates' average and dispersion on the average and dispersion of loan interest rates).
Finally, the theoretical and empirical analysis has ignored the interaction of pricing decisions for a multi-product bank. The original model that we test in the paper was formulated for single-product firms, but here we treat each bank product as a separate market. The complexity of this issue is out of the reach of the present paper, but we have explored the possibility that banks apply mixed or randomized pricing strategies to avoid being identified as low or high price sellers [Varian (1980) ; Lach (2002) ]. If banks use mixed strategies to set interest rates, the correlation between the interest rates of each bank across different products will be low, as banks will set relatively high interest rates in some products and relatively low rates in others. However, there is an alternative prediction based on common beliefs and expectations of the bank, which predicts that pricing decisions of that bank across products will be highly correlated [Dahlby and West (1986) ].
The actual observed correlation among banks of the interest rates of two different products will help to discern which of the two explanations about pricing behavior is more likely to be true (mixed strategies or common future expectations). To perform the test, we compute the Spearman's rank order correlation coefficient of interest rates across bank products for each quarter and for five provinces, which amounts to 66,990 correlation coefficients. 18,295
(12,103) out of the total are statistically significant at a 5% (1%) confidence level, the vast majority with a positive sign. Therefore, only in 27% (18%) of the cases do we find evidence consistent with the hypothesis that common expectations about exogenous variables dictate the pricing strategy of the multi-product bank. This result contrasts with that of Dahlby and West, who find a positive and significant correlation in practically all cases, but it is consistent with the evidence of low correlation obtained by Sorensen (2000) and Lach (2002) .
The second analysis performed refers to the correlation of interest rates across products over time, also measured through the Spearman's rank order correlation coefficient. The correlation between two consecutive years is positive and statistically significant at 5% (1%) in 91% (80%) of the cases in all of the periods. However, after six years (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) ) the number of positive and significant correlation coefficients has dropped to 26% (18.3%) of the total. Although the yearto-year changes in the ranking of interest rates are low, the cumulative changes over time are large, a conclusion similar to that of Dahlby and West for a single insurance product and one geographic market. Overall, the results point towards pricing strategies by banks that complicate consumer learning and perpetuate price dispersion in the markets.
Conclusion
This paper provides empirical support for the hypothesis that customers' search costs affect the level and dispersion of interest rates on loans and deposits by Spanish banks. The evidence supports the predictions from the search model proposed by Carlson and McAfee (1983) to explain price formation in markets with heterogeneous sellers and buyers with uniformly distributed search costs. That model predicts that the level of average prices in the market will decrease with the number of firms and that price dispersion will increase as the number of firms also increases, for a given distribution of marginal costs of the firms in the market. We find that, as the number of banks increases in a market, deposit (loan) interest rates tend to increase (decrease) while dispersion in interest rates in both markets increases with the number of banks.
We also find that the average level and dispersion of interest rates of loans are significantly explained by the level and dispersion of interest rates of deposits, which is consistent with theories of the banking firm that imply vertical integration between loans and deposits in banking decisions.
Therefore, besides informing the literature of search costs, the results of the paper are also of interest for the theory of the banking firm and for the implementation of monetary policy.
We perform a product-by-product analysis (twelve loan products and ten deposit products) because any attempt to aggregate a set of bank products into a common model for all of them was empirically rejected (i.e., econometric tests gave strong evidence of model misspecification). Each bank product is more properly described as a separate market, where interest rate formation is the result of a competitive dynamic substantially different from the rest of the products. One implication of this evidence is that, besides the general conclusion about search costs as determinants of loan and deposit interest rates, there are some products for which the evidence is more conclusive than for others. This result suggests that there are other structural factors affecting the level and dispersion of interest rates of loans and deposits. In this respect, switching costs, informative advertising, and interest-rate smoothing are potential factors that explain interest rate formation and that should be accounted for in future research.
The results of the paper also show that brick-and-mortar markets can work quite differently from Internet markets under consumers' search costs. It will be interesting to see how the results of our paper may change with the diffusion of Internet banking. 
DETERMINANTS OF THE DISPERSION (COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION) OF INTEREST RATES ACROSS PROVINCES
The dependent variable is the coefficient of variation across banks of interest rates of product i quoted in province m at time t. NBANKSmt is the number of banks with transactions in product i in province m at period t; DENBRANCHmt is the density of branches (number of branches per square kilometer) in province m at period t; CV rmtdeposit is the coefficient of variation of the interest rates of the Deposit products; Dimt is the specific inflation of product i in province m during period t; SHARENAmt is the percentage of the banks in province m at time t that operate nationwide; POPULATIONmt is the population of province m at time t; PINCOMEmt is the GDP per capita of the province. All of the explanatory variables but Dimt and SHARENAmt are expressed in logarithms. We have estimated the coefficients through the GMM-system technique (first step) to take into account potential problems of persistence and endogeneity in the number of banks, branches and cost of deposits. 
DETERMINANTS OF THE DISPERSION (RANGE) OF RESIDUAL INTEREST RATES ACROSS PROVINCES
The dependent variable is the range (difference between percentiles 90th and 10th divided by the average of the distribution) across banks of interest rates of product i quoted in province m at time t. NBANKSmt is the number of banks with transactions in product i in province m at period t; DENBRANCHmt is the density of branches (number of branches per square kilometer) in province m at period t; Range rmtdeposit is the range of the interest rates (divided by their average) of the Deposit products; Dimt is the specific inflation of product i in province m during period t; SHARENAmt is the percentage of the banks in province m at time t that operate nationwide; POPULATIONmt is the population of province m at time t;
PINCOMEmt is the GDP per capita of the province. All the explanatory variables but Dimt and SHARENAmt are expressed in logarithms. We have estimated the coefficients through the GMM-system technique (first step) to take into account potential problems of persistence and endogeneity in the numbers of banks and branches and the cost of deposits. All of the estimations contain time dummy variables. The coefficients are expressed in their long-term value. We report the p-values of Sargan's test of overidentifying restrictions and secondorder autocorrelation tests, whose null hypotheses are, respectively, compatibility of orthogonality conditions and absence of second-order autocorrelation in the error term. The last column presents the F-statistics from the tests of aggregate significance of the time and province effects, where the number of observations is 750 and the number of restrictions is 64 in all the regressions. All of the tests reject the null hypothesis of non-significance. 
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